Book Chapters

Forthcoming:

The Bloomsbury Companion to Emilie Du Châtelet

Abstract. In the second chapter of her Institutions de Physique Emilie Du Châtelet gives two cosmological arguments for the existence of God. In this chapter, I focus on the first of these arguments. I argue that, while it bears some significant similarities to arguments given by John Locke and Christian Wolff, it improves on these arguments in at least two ways. First, it avoids a potential equivocation in Locke's argument; and second, it avoids Wolff's mere stipulation that whoever claims that there cannot be an infinite regress of contingent beings does not understand what a sufficient reason is. I finally argue that her argument avoids a related objection, considered by David Hume, on which to explain a causal chain is merely to explain each link in the chain.

The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon

[final draft]

The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon

[final draft]

The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon

[final draft]

Stephen Harrop > Publications

Articles

Forthcoming:

Analytic Philosophy

[draft]

Abstract. I give an argument for a version of the principle of sufficient reason from several plausible principles about negative facts and necessary conditions. I then give an argument for a slightly weaker version of the principle without the reference to negative facts.

Published (newest to oldest):

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science

[published version]

Abstract. In this paper, I argue for two main theses. The first is that Spinoza held that space consists of relations between bodies. This creates a problem for his account of individuation. The second thesis is that he can solve this problem by appealing to another doctrine he accepted, that there is absolute motion. I conclude that Spinoza was among the first early modern figures to reject absolute space but accept absolute motion.

Res Philosophica

[published version]

Abstract. Forthcoming in a special issue on Alex Douglas' The Philosophy of Hope: Beatitude in Spinoza.

Erkenntnis

[published version]

Abstract. Priority monism is the doctrine that there is only one basic object: the entire cosmos. Priority monists often take this to be a metaphysically necessary thesis. I explore the consequences of modalizing the priority monist thesis. I argue that, modulo some assumptions, the modalized thesis entails the necessary existence of the actual cosmos. I further argue that, if the modalized thesis is true, and the actual cosmos necessarily exists, then the only possible concrete objects are the actually existing ones.

Proslogion

Analysis

[published version]

Abstract. Kearns (2021) argues that there is a parody version of Anselm's ontological argument (a "gontological argument") which shows that God does not exist. I show that Anselm considers one of the key premises in Kearns' gontological argument, and explicitly gives an argument which entails its falsity, and hence the unsoundness of the supposed parody argument.

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science

[published version]

Abstract. I examine the (mediated) correspondence between Spinoza and Robert Boyle concerning the latter’s account of fluidity and his experiments on reconstitution of niter in the light of the epistemology and doctrine of method contained in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. I argue that both the Treatise and the correspondence reveal that for Spinoza, the proper method of science is not experimental, and that he accepted a powerful under-determination thesis. I argue that, in contrast to modern versions, Spinoza’s form of naturalism was a highly rationalist and anti-empirical one. I conclude with a brief account of the value of experience and experimentation for Spinoza’s scientific method.

Journal of Scottish Philosophy

[published version]

Abstract. I examine the views of Thomas Reid with respect to a certain version of the problem of induction: Why are inductions using natural kinds successful, and what justifies them? I argue that while both Reid holds a kind of conventionalist view about natural kinds, this conventionalism has a realistic component which allows him to answer both questions.

History of Philosophy Quarterly

[published version]

Abstract. Leibniz often refers to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as something like a first principle. In some texts, however, he attempts to give positive arguments in its favor. I examine two such arguments, and find them wanting. The first argument has two defects. First, it is question-begging; and second, when the question-begging step is excised, the principle one can in fact derive is highly counter-intuitive. The second argument is valid, but has the defect of only reaching a nearly trivial conclusion.

Home

About

Research

Publications